Conditioned Sovereignty: The Creation and Legitimation of Spaces of Violence in Counterterrorism Operations of the “War on Terror” by Prinz, Janosch & Schetter, Conrad
 1 
 
Just published in Alternatives see here: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/eprint/gBDIGaVE4AYVCqxF78pm/full  
 
Conditioned Sovereignty: The Creation and Legitimation of Spaces of 
Violence in ‘War on Terror’ 
 
Janosch Prinz1 & Conrad  Schetter2 
 
Introduction 
 
The main aim of this paper is to shed light on the challenge to state sovereignty from the 
angle of changes in the spatial formation of organized violence in the course of the ‘War on 
Terror’ since 9/11. We particularly seek to make sense of how new and alternative spaces of 
violence are conceptualised and legitimised. 
 
The article develops two main lines of argument. The first is that the conceptualization of new 
spaces of violence in the ‘War on Terror’ – so-called ‘ungoverned spaces’ - leads toward an 
understanding of sovereignty which is conditioned: on the one hand by Western norms of 
statehood centered on the monopoly on violence (to the perceived lack of which the 
discourses on spaces of violence seek to respond); on the other hand, by the sheer 
technological advances in warfare. The second line of argument is that the creation and 
discursive legitimation of new spaces of has brought to the fore a growing tension between 
the ‘monopoly on violence’ and ‘territorial integrity’ aspects of the current international, state 
sovereignty-centered order.  
 
In order to contextualize and gradually develop these lines of argument, the article is divided 
into four main sections: After a brief introduction to our conceptual understanding of ‘spaces 
of violence’, the first section of this article will present an interpretation of the main markers 
of modern Western statehood as standing in a ‘triangle of sovereignty’. It will then discuss 
how shifts to this triangle in the past decades prepared the ground for the emergence and 
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discursive justification of new spaces of violence. This discussion will offer the canvas on 
which the development of the legitimatory discourse for new spaces of violence in the ‘War 
on Terror’ will be sketched. The third section will outline the concept and doctrine of 
ungoverned spaces and relate it to the challenges to the triangle of sovereignty. The fourth 
section will chart how the logic of recent drone operations, which builds on the ungoverned 
spaces discourse, further heightens the tension between the professed sovereignty- (and law-) 
centered international order and the challenge to this order implicit in such spaces of violence. 
 
 
Spaces of Violence 
 
The linkage between violence and space is conceived as an academic caveat, as Springer and 
Le Billon1 have recently pointed out. This comes as a surprise, since violence includes 
evidently a spatial dimension.2 Spaces of violence appear in formations such as places, scales, 
territories, networks or positionalities3. Concrete examples for spaces of violence are e.g. 
‘checkpoints’, ‘battlefields’, ‘cyber war’ or the ‘body’.4 Imaginative geographies such as 
imperial or ethno-religious cartographies also include an inherent logic of violence.5 If anyone 
was in doubt about the links between space and violence, the emergence of Geography as an 
academic discipline as rooted in colonialism and particularly in military studies reinforces this 
point.6  
 
While our understanding of ‘spaces of violence’ connects notions of space with specific forms 
of organized violence in general, in this article we focus on spatial figurations in counter-
terrorism warfare. Hereby we follow a narrow understanding of violence as an organized act, 
which intends to do physical damage to a body or an object,7 although we acknowledge that 
there is an intensive and ongoing debate about the ontology of violence,8 which tends to 
include structure, communication, representation as well as symbols.9  
 
Departing from this narrow understanding of violence, we follow an understanding of space 
which is rooted in constructivism. Space is the product (and process) of arranging human 
beings and material goods into relational structures of order, which are time and again (re-
)produced by human cognition and practices.10 Key for our understanding is that space entails 
fluidity. Or in the words of Doreen Massey, space is “… always under construction”.11 
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However, there are time and again attempts by mankind to interrupt or suspend the fluid 
character of space – this can be regarded in itself as an act of violence. The idea of the 
territory is perhaps the most prominent example of the endeavour to statically bind space to 
the exercise of violence.12 
 
And while the creation of space cannot be seen independently of interactions we have to 
consider that the ‘production of space’13 at the same time strongly impacts social relations, 
practices and perceptions. Take again the example of the territory. Its existence not only 
encloses the spatial expression of the sovereignty of the nation state. What is more, the 
implementation and continuity of a territory go hand in hand with the production of logics, 
rules, representations and practices which are inherent to the particular territorial formation. 
Social interactions are hence central to our understanding of ‘spaces of violence’ centre which 
are constitutive for the conducting of any acts of violence. What then is the distinctive 
characteristic of spaces of violence for us? In short, such spaces either are directly linked in 
their emergence to practices of violence and/ or they present a certain spatially-mediated form 
of violence.  
 
Considering that the field of ‘space of violence’ is an emerging one and different approaches 
can be identified14, our approach is inspired by two strands of research which both depart 
from the ‘War on Terror’. On the one side there is Stuart Elden’s15 seminal work on how the 
relations between territory and terror are being reconfigured under the conditions of the ‘War 
on Terror’. On the other side, Derek Gregory’s16 significant studies explore how the ‘War on 
Terror’ gives way to an ‘everywhere war’, which blurs the differentiation of war and peace 
and on territorial boundaries. We will use the example of Ungoverned Spaces to bring both 
strands of thought together and to show how spaces of violence emerges which are both 
territorial and exceptional. We thereby seek to question the possibility of an exclusively 
descriptive use of the term, linked the operational stock-taking of the complete absence of 
state power.17 We will now turn to the belief in territory as ordering principle of organized 
violence which serves as the departing point for our discussion of the creation and 
legitimation of spaces of violence in the ‘War on Terror’. 
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The Triangle of Sovereignty 
 
The world order based on nation states, dominant since the 19th century, relies on a necessary 
connection between statehood and the use of coercive force across a geodetically fixed 
territory18. Thus sovereignty rooted in a state's monopoly on the use of force always entailed a 
spatial dimension, giving rise to a triangular relationship between territory, organized 
violence, and statehood19. The concept of ‘territory’ expresses this spatialised exercise of 
power and constitutes a necessary condition for national sovereignty20. So the sovereignty of a 
state has ‘classically’ been judged by the state's capacity to enforce a monopoly on violence 
across its territory. This sets the limits on the shape and size of the respective state. The 
territorial order can be seen as the most prominent formation of spaces of organized violence.  
In the genesis and evolution of the nation state since the Peace of Westphalia settlement of 
1648 the idea of statehood has undergone enormous changes and upheavals in the way people 
have understood the subject of sovereignty and of governance. Yet, despite these changes, the 
dominance of this triangle of sovereignty and its internal structure has been an element of 
great continuity. However, the relationship between ‘government’ and population has 
arguably developed into (or at least enabled) a rationality of macro-control which Michel 
Foucault21 called gouvernmentalité (governmentality). We hold – against Foucault's thesis 
that the system of states based on the concept of sovereignty has been superseded – that still 
today the idea of a triangle of sovereignty has traction. At its core is the notion of sovereignty 
as the measure of statehood on the international stage, yet this is now combined with 
advanced forms of governmental rationality, of forms of “conduire des conduits”22. This 
combination leads to an understanding of state power that is both broader and more indirect 
than on classical accounts (e.g. by Thomas Hobbes or Max Weber). We shall explore below 
the significance of this indirect power and the question of how this indirect power turns to 
organized violence. We shall also discuss the tensions between the persistence of sovereignty 
(and with it the possibility of far-reaching exercise of force), on the one hand, and the further 
development of the rationality of governance with a focus on indirect power, on the other; 
both issues present crucial perspectives on the current challenges to the triangle of 
sovereignty. 
 
 
Neoliberal Shifts 
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In the course of the second half of the 20th century, especially in the wake of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, for the first time it was realized that the triangle of sovereignty, monopoly 
on violence and territory was facing growing challenges. A neoliberal understanding of 
government began to take hold. The state now predominantly appeared to be regarded only as 
a necessary evil to be kept to a minimum as the principles of the free market, electoral 
democracy and human rights were being rolled out worldwide. At a deeper level, however, 
the aim to more effectively impose – through a strengthened executive – the infrastructural 
changes needed to facilitate the dynamics of a new global economy arguably led to ‘free 
market strong states’23. In short, such states depend on having a strong security apparatus – 
strong in terms of both its budgetary resources and its legal powers. The changes have, more 
recently, also involved increasingly outspoken militarisation of policing (see Neocleous 
201424 for the longstanding intersections between policing and war) and the merger of, at 
least, secret service and (private) military companies, as exemplified by the USA25. Hence it 
appears more appropriate here to speak of a shift in, rather than an erosion of, the state's 
functions in the process of neoliberalisation. 
 
Moreover, the accelerating flows of people, data and commodities, conventionally referred to 
as globalisation, increase the porosity of territorial borders and present a challenge to the 
state's ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force26. This is why we today see 
politicians as well as security think tanks identifying refugee flows, economies of violence, 
terrorist networks, piracy, cyber-attacks or epidemics as threats to the prosperity and security 
of Western societies27. Moreover, smouldering civil conflicts that repeatedly flare up – like 
those in the Middle East, the Hindu Kush, the Horn of Africa, Africa's Great Lakes region or 
Eastern Europe – not only involve challenges to national sovereignty but are also perceived as 
a threat to Western interests (e.g. free world trade, immigration controls) and to values that 
are declared universal (as captured by the idea of human rights). The response to this 
increasingly visible gap between a (neo)liberal world order and the perceived disorder is, on 
the one hand, a return to the idea of the state as a marker of territorially defined order and, on 
the other hand, a search for mechanisms to suspend national sovereignty in cases where a 
state fails to meet international standards or to accept Western interests. This, again, can be 
read as an indicator that the process of neoliberalisation is not per se aimed at hollowing out 
the state but uses the state apparatus as an organised force in pursuit of national (and/or elite 
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class) interests28. Overall, these processes and discourses bring tensions to the fore between 
efforts to uphold a state- and sovereignty-centred, formally egalitarian world order and the 
simultaneous moves that seem to undermine it. While we cannot address these tensions in full 
here, we will limit our attention to changes in the conception of spaces of violence which 
elucidate those tensions. The next step to take in this regard is to consider the normative 
conception of statehood and the codification of the monopoly on violence in order to 
understand the recent challenges to the latter. 
 
 
Ideals of Statehood, the Monopoly on Violence and Conditioned Sovereignty  
 
Public discussion of statehood over the last twenty years has been in the grip of categorical 
thinking leaving little space for qualitative changes to how state power is exercised: at one 
end of the scale are the extreme cases of a ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state, while at the other end is 
an imagined ideal of order. This ideal has its roots in a normative model of the state that first 
appeared in Max Weber’s writings in 1921/2229. Central to the model is the idea of a 
monopoly on violence giving the state exclusive powers to tax, to set and enforce rules and 
regulations that apply to every citizen and denizen and, importantly, to impose sanctions 
whenever these rules are violated. In this sense the state is defined as sovereign because no 
other political authority stands above it.30 And, right up to the present day, this focus on an 
ideal-typical autonomous statehood has produced negative definitions of anything that 
deviates from it. Where states do not meet the standards set, for which their monopoly on the 
use of force is a central criterion, attributes must be found to express the gap between reality 
and ideal. Terms like ‘ailing’, ‘weak’, ‘fragile’, ‘failed’ or ‘deformed’ imply that the 
respective state seems to ‘function’ in a manner that is outside the normative model of a state 
and its relationship with society31. This normative disqualification of political and social 
orders is ahistorical inasmuch as it ignores the extremely violent history behind the emergence 
of many different forms of state, including Western states, in the late 19th and in the 20th 
centuries32. Even though nation-building historically does not correspond to good governance 
criteria, the following, doubly problematic assumption is commonplace: an idealization of 
one's own, i.e. Western, statehood is combined with inadequate consideration for the process 
of emergence of those (post-colonial) states whose sovereignty is being called into doubt.  
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Such criticisms of the functionality of certain states or, rather, of the consequences of their 
dysfunctionality have led to challenges to the ‘classic’ sovereignty model in which the 
monopoly on violence is a necessary ingredient. When the Montevideo Convention of 1933 
laid down, under the aegis of the United States, the criteria for statehood, it established the 
principle that states – no matter how ‘weak’ they may be – have sovereignty over all internal 
affairs.33 This amounted to a ban on interventions and accorded legitimacy to the respective 
states with regard to upholding their territorial sovereignty and asserting their monopoly on 
the use of force, the latter in accordance with their own standards. This framework remained 
more or less unquestioned until the dominant powers stuck to the non-intervention rule in the 
face of the Rwandan genocide of 1994.34 The strong criticism of the established 
understanding of national sovereignty which ensued initiated a shift in normative debates 
from the focus on functionality of the state to the freedoms, opportunities and protection of 
the individual: The widely discussed and cited concepts of human security and responsibility 
to protect (r2p), which are designed to legitimise interventions to protect a population, played 
a prominent role for this shift35. However, initial attempts to establish standards of ethical 
responsibility for interventions and to bring them to bear on political practice have proven to 
be extremely challenging36. The normative conditioning of sovereignty has been undermined 
by the fact that high-cost interventions are, in practice, ultimately driven by political will and 
economic and geopolitical interests37. It is further problematic that even if normative concepts 
such as r2p played a role, the gap between theory and practice has thus far tended to discredit 
the theory as well as the practice, e.g. in the case of Libya. It seems safe to say that the 
contradiction between the normative conditioning of sovereignty and the continuity of an 
international system formally based on equal state sovereignty has thus far limited the sway of 
discourses of conditioned sovereignty. However, the conditioning of sovereignty in the 
context of counter-terrorist operations of the War on Terror, particularly through the concept 
of ‘ungoverned spaces’, has arguably been better able to accommodate this tensions and to 
connect normative justifications with geopolitical interests. This is why we turn next to the 
emergence of the concept of ungoverned spaces. 
 
 
Ungoverned Spaces: Legitimating New Spaces of Violence in the War on Terror 
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Since the 9/11 attacks the functional and normative dimensions of the conditioning of national 
sovereignty have been increasingly linked to pragmatic considerations of Realpolitik – a trend 
exemplified by the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan38. State failure was now placed in a 
direct causal connection with terrorist threats and human insecurity (poverty, hunger, etc.)39. 
Policymakers began explaining security deficits in particular by emphasising a spatial–causal 
interpretation of the connection between terrorism and state failure. In 2003, for instance, 
Joschka Fischer, then Germany's Foreign Minister, saw "black holes of disorder" in every part 
of the world40– holes thought to be causing government collapse and destabilise whole 
regions through spill-over effects. Suddenly it was possible to question not only the 
performance of states, especially in the area of governance, but also their very sovereignty 
and, implicitly, their territorial authority. This way of demarcating spaces of disorder and 
violence began to be taken up by political think tanks and academics from around 2004. The 
Clingendael Center for Strategic Studies presented, in 2005, the first study with a claim to 
scientific rigour that included a world map of ‘black holes’41.  
 
From 2004 we can observe a shift in the debate – especially in US political circles – from 
‘fragile states’ via ‘black holes’ on to ‘ungoverned spaces/ territories’42. Unlike the concept of 
‘black holes’, which did not catch on due to its bleakly negative connotations and has now all 
but disappeared, the synonymously used terms ‘ungoverned territories’ and ‘ungoverned 
spaces’ appear at first glance to represent a far more sober and analytical outlook.43 The US 
military has, since 2006, been commissioning research (especially by the Rand Corporation) 
to provide some theoretical underpinnings capable of legitimising these concepts. Both 
concepts have been used repeatedly in speeches by US President Barak Obama and by the last 
three Secretaries of State (Condoleezza Rice, Hillary Clinton and John Kerry) as well as in 
core strategy documents from the US security community44. More recently the terms have 
also gained currency in transatlantic45 and European debates: in January 2013 the British 
Prime Minister David Cameron called Mali an ‘ungoverned space’; on 13 June 2014 German 
Foreign Minister Franz-Walter Steinmeier voiced concerns about an ungoverned space, this 
time one emerging in Iraq due to conquests by so-called Islamic State/Daesh46.  
 
 
‘Ungoverned spaces’ as spaces of conditioned sovereignty  
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The selection of spaces being designated ‘ungoverned’ is guided by a classical definition of 
state territory. Ungoverned spaces are primarily identified on the peripheries of spaces 
effectively controlled by governments47. These spaces include border regions as well as air 
corridors and maritime transport routes. We are also seeing the term ungoverned spaces 
increasingly used for civil war regions such as Afghanistan/ Pakistan, Syria/ Iraq, Somalia or 
Libya48. Among US think tanks there has been what can only be called a race to identify new 
ungoverned spaces. This boom in ungoverned spaces only highlights the underlying problem 
of distinguishing governed from ungoverned space.49 
 
The discourse on ‘ungoverned spaces’ seeks to localise non-state actors who are seen as a 
threat mainly by Western security agencies. It proceeds on the assumption that where there 
are effectively no state structures spaces emerge which can serve violent actors such as 
terrorists, rebels or mafia networks as spaces for transit, flight and refuge and as ‘safe 
havens’50. From this perspective, ‘ungovernedness’ per se creates a situation in which, having 
neglected certain areas, a state permits, enables or even promotes on its territory threats which 
then indirectly or directly endanger third-party states. Even though some authors51 emphasise 
the causal connection between the loss of control over national territory and the emergence of 
a terrorist threat, a causal connection between territorial control and the rise of terrorism is 
still strongly disputed. Ken Menkhaus52, for instance, points out on the example of Somalia 
that terrorists do not find the logistics necessary for their operations in weak states and argues 
that they are unlikely to enjoy any reliable protection in precisely in such countries. 
 
Echoing the debate on fragile statehood, the discussion of ungoverned spaces conceives them 
as the antithesis of an imaginary ideal ‘governed’ state. It is this comparison that makes 
‘ungoverned’ political structures automatically negative. And the negative perception is then 
reinforced by the claim that premodern and/ or illegitimate forms of society are bound to 
dominate in ungoverned spaces. Note, for example, how often the term ‘tribe’ appears in 
contrast to ‘state’ in an influential study of Rand corporation53 whenever patterns of order in 
ungoverned spaces are discussed. Thus, the concept of the ungoverned ultimately implies that 
only a state has full political legitimacy and that non-state institutions and actors are, in 
essence, politically illegitimate54. However, this understanding overlooks the very fact that, 
even in societies not permeated by the state, elements of social order always exist and the 
condition of being ‘ungoverned’ is never permanent55. Indeed, one could almost make the 
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opposite case: namely that phenomena considered illegitimate, like warlordism, clientelism 
and corruption, occur most intensively in ‘hybrid zones of competing governance’56 where 
informal logics have become embedded in state structures, i.e. in situations where the state is 
very much present; and that they are less common in spaces far removed from state 
penetration. Furthermore, the concept of ‘ungoverned spaces’ is rooted in a classic nation-
state understanding of territory. This approach overlooks the fact that people are spatially 
mobile and have their own supra-regional networks and structures. They are certainly not 
limited to rigid territorial references when making political decisions. Indeed, a further aspect 
ignored here is that social groups themselves produce spaces – ranging from mental maps to 
their own territories – and these spaces frequently run counter to the territorialising ambitions 
of a state57. 
 
Much of the importance of the concept of ‘ungoverned spaces’ thus stems from the fact that 
locating ‘ungoverned spaces’ is connected to questioning sovereignty. In the eyes of those 
seeking exclusive power to determine where and when spaces are ‘ungoverned’, a state can be 
targeted once it fails to perform – even if only in part – its most essential function: territory-
wide enforcement of its monopoly on the use of force. Thus, inherent in the ‘ungoverned 
spaces’ discourse is the possibility of delegitimising certain states and thus legitimising 
external interventions. Much like the debate over ‘failed states’, legitimising an at least partial 
suspension of the international legal order requires the identification of ungoverned spaces. 
This may seem contradictory in as far as one of the reasons for developing the ungoverned 
spaces concept is protection from terrorist attacks and upholding the current world order of 
sovereign nation states. Ungoverned spaces thus turn into territorialised containers in which 
external political and military interventions are legitimate, as part of an imperative to uphold 
the world order based on nation states. Yet this means nothing less than rolling back the 
sovereignty of the states affected58: the US drone attacks and deployment of Special Forces in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, in Yemen or in Somalia are all too well-known examples of how 
this happens. As such, preventive action in ungoverned spaces may be considered an 
offensive pursuit of interests rather than defense against threats. Arguing in favour of this 
approach, Barry Zellen59, for example, sees ungoverned spaces not only as a threat to US 
security but also, on the contrary, as an opportunity, i.e. they become opportune spaces for the 
US to take military/intelligence steps to reassert its global hegemony: 
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“The underlying tribal topology of these ‘ungoverned territories’ or tribal zones 
as I prefer to think of them presents numerous strategic opportunities for 
containing and/or rolling back communism (in China, Laos, and Vietnam), 
combating dictatorship and oligarchy (in Burma, Guatemala and southern 
Mexico; and the Andean highlands) and securing access to newly emergent 
natural resources (in the Arctic regions, Africa, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
much of South and Central Asia).”60  
 
What then characterises the conceptual innovation behind ‘ungoverned spaces’ is a 
contradictory and politicised split in the concept of sovereignty: on the one hand, the idea of 
sovereignty is needed to uphold the status quo of the international order of states and state-
centred territorial thinking; on the other, the state's monopoly on the use of coercive force, 
which it must exercise in its own territory if it is allowed to be sovereign (and thus be a state), 
is scrutinised and challenged. Therefore the identification of ‘ungoverned spaces’ carries the 
corollary of casting the sovereignty of the assessed states in doubt. This chiasmic nexus is 
illustrated in core documents of US-security and defense politics. For instance, the Global 
Strategic Assessment of the International Center for Strategic Studies reads as follows:  
 
“If some states are unable to fulfill these obligations … there will be 
considerable pressure on others, whose people are targeted by terrorists 
enjoying sanctuary in ungoverned areas, to take matters into their own 
hands.”61  
 
Additionally, the National Defense Strategy concludes: 
 
“We will work with and through like-minded states to help shrink the 
ungoverned areas of the world and thereby deny extremists and other hostile 
parties sanctuary. By helping others to police themselves and their regions, we 
will collectively address threats to the broader international system.”62  
 
What follows is a partial abrogation of territorial control and thus the delegitimising of certain 
states – a move which can be seen to be clearly in line with the shifts in the understanding of 
sovereignty traced above. The principle of ‘territorial control’, a longstanding pillar of the 
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world order, is now being replaced by the principle of ‘security’ – even if the prerogative to 
define what is to be understood by security and to whom it should apply remains reserved for 
certain political actors, i.e. the US and NATO allies. These shifts cause a proliferation of 
(potential) spaces of violence.  
 
 
Ungoverned Spaces and New Forms of Organized Violence 
 
The construction of ungoverned spaces in which external violence becomes legitimate (and 
necessary to prevent violence in governed spaces) is associated with new forms of organized 
violence. The ‘ungoverned spaces’ discourse revolves around the idea of spaces as ‘territories 
of the other’ – especially of Islamist movements like Islamic State/ Daesh, al-Shabaab, the 
Taliban, al-Qaeda or Boko Haram. In the selection of ungoverned spaces there is an almost 
exclusive concentration on regions in the Middle East, Asia, Latin America and Africa. The 
very selection of regions follows a hierarchization that has its precursors in colonial world 
views as well as in certain development policy assumptions63. The West, with the exception 
of so-called “Muslim ghettos”64 in major West European cities, is regarded as ‘governed 
space’, while the ‘ungoverned’ comes with an exoticisation. Such views may also be 
understood as a reaction to the failure of (post-)colonial disciplining (in Foucault’s sense of a 
‘form of government’). Ungoverned spaces are directly associated with exotic spatial imagery 
that emphasise the ‘tribal’, the ‘disorderly’, the ‘inscrutable’.65 The clear message here is that 
any external actors who enter such ‘ungoverned spaces’ will not only be stepping into a 
danger zone but will be fighting a lost cause from the outset. Ungoverned spaces appear as 
regions that a military mission on the ground can hardly control, let alone ‘civilize’.  
 
The discourse on ‘ungoverned spaces’ is hence no longer concerned primarily with nation-
building, which is seen as mission impossible. And it is no accident that discussion of 
‘ungoverned spaces’ coincides with a shift in US-policy away from constructing a 
functioning, normatively legitimate state through its ‘War on Terror’-interventions in 
Afghanistan (since 2001) and Iraq (2003-2011). Although the US still analyses the 
weaknesses of states with a desire for them to build capacity and take control of their own 
territory, there is little willingness to engage in time-consuming and cost-intensive 
interventions for nation-building. The turn away from policies entailing a regime of 
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occupation has led to a transition to a new stage of warfare, one geared to rapid, localised 
strikes based on high mobility: interventions light66.  
 
The concept of ‘ungoverned spaces’, with its principal emphasis on the extraordinary 
lawlessness within a space, allows external interventions without any basis in law to appear as 
legitimate means. Ungoverned spaces are, therefore, conceived in a way that serves the 
establishment of a territorial definition of a zone in which violence is no longer bound by state 
order or the rule of law but is merely a matter of the attacker's own choice of instrument. 
Military interventions and other security measures are no longer directed at the national 
territory as a whole but only at specific areas. Recent examples are the air strikes conducted in 
northern Iraq. In these new spaces of violence, the US-American superpower no longer has to 
occupy whole countries in order to put them under its control, i.e. they no longer appear to be 
bound by the conventions of warfare that apply to land war67. We can see here how the US is 
fine-tuning its intervention policies to the conditions of zones of exception that can be far 
smaller than a whole national territory. This understanding of ‘ungoverned spaces’ makes 
them predestined to become the target of covert operations and punitive actions by Special 
Forces, intelligence operatives or drone attacks. These regions thus turn into new spaces of 
violence. 
 
The way the concept of ‘ungoverned spaces’ has developed is, therefore, closely bound up 
with the development of new military technologies and strategies as well as with the question 
of how war is envisaged in the future. The concept of ‘ungoverned spaces’ can be employed 
to legitimise a policy of intervention that is no longer rooted in notions of political 
responsibility, as expressed for instance in the idea of state-building, but based solely on the 
need to exert control, thus opening the prospect of increasingly un-demarcated war68. It is also 
possible, however, to interpret the notion of ‘ungoverned spaces’ in such a way that it serves 
as an argument against such a complete removal of the spatial boundaries of war and provide 
a formula for compromise between territorial containment and the ubiquitous deployment of 
drones in so-called ‘kill boxes’. We shall now examine some operationalizations of the new 
spaces of violence. 
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Responding to Ungoverned Spaces: The logic of drone strikes  
 
In the War on Terror, the formation of new spaces of violence is driven by asymmetry. While 
this had already been proclaimed as the hallmark of the ‘new wars’ at the beginning of the 
present millennium69, asymmetry confronted the Western world in the form of terrorism with 
a new urgency in the post-9/11 era. With attacks by ‘insurgents’ (especially in the form of 
improvised explosive devices) leading to high numbers of casualties in Iraq or Afghanistan, 
the response has, for some years now, been to follow a similar logic and orchestrate drone 
attacks70. The permanent insecurity and fear of sudden attacks with which insurgents have 
kept Afghanistan and Pakistan in suspense is matched by the military strategic and above all 
psychological principle71 applied in US-drone warfare in places such as the Pakistani region 
bordering Afghanistan known as the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). Grégoire 
Chamayou72 has pointedly classified this type of military operation as a form of state 
terrorism. If terrorists first created an asymmetry by fighting conventional armies with 
guerrilla techniques, a new asymmetry has been achieved by means of technical superiority: 
drone attacks create spaces of exception in which the inhabitants are permanently exposed – 
without defence and without warning – to the threat of extermination. If these interventions 
ever had any legitimacy beyond the domestic US context (and even this is questionable), it 
has largely been lost through the deployment of drones.73 As reflected in the decision to 
deploy drones, ungoverned spaces are “wild zone of power”74 in which any rule of law is 
suspended and the rules of civilization do not apply. The logic of drone strikes is an extension 
of a colonial argument for the right to attack ‘savages’. After all, the rationalisation for the use 
of lethal drones as an asymmetric form of warfare is based on the view that its potential 
victims are enemies of civilisation, if not enemies of humanity. The people targeted are 
classed as ‘evil doers’, condemned without trial, deprived of all rights – people who may be 
killed preventatively75. The justification for this extreme form of preventative warfare builds 
on the ethical and cultural denigration and depoliticisation of the potential victim. In this way, 
the discourse on ‘ungoverned spaces’ echoes Carl Schmitt’s dichotomy by implying that the 
targets of drone warfare no longer constitute ‘real enemies’ but ‘absolute enemies’, i.e. 
enemies who are standing outside the legal order, indeed outside the accepted global 
community/ civilization76. From a legal point of view, there are also pragmatic grounds for 
this line of argument: for if potential victims were treated as criminals, in many cases the 
evidence presented against them would hardly suffice for a judicially sound conviction, 
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especially if one were to apply the very rule-of-law standards the US claims to be defending. 
All this has far-reaching consequences for the quality of warfare; for we now no longer have 
two opponents lining up against each other but a ‘manhunt’ in which the fugitive becomes the 
‘prey’77. The premodern status of ‘outlaw’ and ‘lawlessness’ thus returns to contemporary 
politics. Today, however, judgement without trial is effected by information technology, 
enabling a combination of survey and profiling techniques: databases, gathered covertly and 
not subject to any public scrutiny of their validity, are crossed with logarithms of movement 
patterns and moral–cultural criteria attributed to the actors. If, say, within the FATA more 
than ten people come together in one place, this event is in itself considered suspicious from 
an US-intelligence perspective and will automatically trigger a high alert response by the 
CIA. When debriefing in the wake of a US-drone strike, every male fatality of fighting age 
(from adolescent up to the very old) is counted as an insurgent78. Note also that the 
asymmetry between hunter and hunted, now taken to the extreme, is at odds with the formal–
egalitarian constitution of the international community.  
 
Drone strikes might also be seen as a kind of pre-emptive punitive expedition which is 
designed to prevent violations of disciplinary rules (even if these have not actually been 
announced to the victim) from reaching a higher level of organisation. This follows a neo-
colonial logic, because preventing forms of organisation from emerging outside Western 
norm requirements is an attempt to curb the development of political and social orders and 
thus helps turn the discourse on ‘ungovernedness’ into a self-fulfilling prophecy. In this way, 
any political movement that aims to create a form of political order other than the nation state 
– such as so-called Islamic State in Syria/ Iraq or al-Shabaab’s Islamic State in Somalia – is 
portrayed as an ‘absolute enemy’. 
 
A not inconsiderable factor when assessing the impact of drone deployment on the 
relationship between space and violence, or spaces of violence, is the new way in which space 
is experienced. First of all, for the drone operators the perception of the space is mediated via 
the screen in their work environment, while the potential victims usually find themselves in a 
familiar space. The way in which this space is transformed from one moment to the next into 
a space of organized violence is certainly something we would normally associate with 
terrorist methods. It illustrates that the logic of drone missions is the mirror image of aspects 
of the operational strategy of the fugitive terrorists and insurgents. 
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Moreover, the use of drones potentially gives rise to a borderless space of violence that is no 
longer subject to any territorial containment and undermines the sovereignty of the nation 
state: 
“From this point of view, it is clear that ‘sovereign borders are among the 
greatest allies’ that a fugitive can have. The hunter’s power has no regard for 
borders. It allows itself the right of universal trespassing, in defiance of 
territorial integrity of sovereign states. It is an invasive power which, unlike the 
imperial manoeuvres of the past, is based less on a notion of right of conquest 
than of a right of pursuit.”79  
 
Being highly mobile and unmanned, drones with their artificial ‘eyes’ are becoming the 
prototypical instrument of combat and power for borderless warfare80. This makes it 
technologically possible in the long run for territorially fixed military constructions to become 
completely superfluous. An expression of this new quality is the term ‘kill box’, a space of 
military violence developed by the US Army in 200581. It refers to a temporarily defined, 
three-dimensional spatial target cube in which integrated joint weapons fire is concentrated. 
The ‘kill box’ differs in a number of aspects from the concept of ‘ungoverned spaces’. For 
one thing, it is a purely functional, operational space of violence for the military and does not 
even raise the question of legitimacy at large but describes purely technical procedures of 
military attack. In the case of nuclear strikes, Henry Nash82 has designated such target 
selection as the “bureaucratization of homicide”. In the case of ‘kill boxes’, as arithmetically 
defined parameters, there is also no requirement to construe and qualify a space with 
reference to governance qualities, something that is attempted in the ‘ungoverned spaces’ 
discourse. The positioning of a ‘kill box’ remains situative and unlimited since it can be 
opened as a temporary mini-space, as a space of exception, anywhere and at any moment as 
soon as a target is located83.  
 
Put another way, the concept of ungoverned spaces is geo-centric, if not per se territorial, and 
remains within territorial thinking; by contrast, the concept of the ‘kill box’ is target-centric, 
concentrating on destroying the body of the enemy or the ‘prey’. Whereas military campaigns 
increasingly narrow their focus to individual ‘kill boxes’ (note here the return to, or continuity 
of, the container idea!), the operational space, i.e. the war zone, spreads without limits. War is 
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conceivable and possible everywhere. By constructing ‘kill boxes’, control is therefore no 
longer understood as something permanently territorial but – following the splitting of the 
idea of sovereignty into the state's monopoly on the use of force and its territorial integrity – 
is replaced by an operational form that is otherwise ascribed to terrorists, a form in which 
violence becomes a constant possibility. In the case of ‘kill boxes’, the attempt to maintain an 
international system of states in its present form and simultaneously stick to the political 
objective of hunting ‘terrorists’ demands a concentration on individuals who – as already 
noted – can be viewed as standing outside the framework of civilization, in a way reminiscent 
of Carl Schmitt's category of the moral, absolute enemy84. Whether this approach can be used 
to achieve disciplinary effects (e.g. deterrence) capable of improving control over 
‘threatening’ norm deviations on a global scale, with drones acting as a kind of mobile 
Panopticon, remains highly doubtful. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The triangle of sovereignty, which defined international politics in the late 19th and 
throughout the 20th century, has ceased to represent the realities of the relationship between 
statehood, monopoly on violence and territory. The concept of sovereignty has been split in 
recent years, being divided into the state's monopoly on violence on the one hand and its 
territorial integrity on the other. The result is that territory and monopoly on violence are no 
longer congruent. In short, while the international system of states, and thereby the territorial 
integrity of states, still constitutes a cornerstone of the political order, there is a growing 
challenge, both in theory and in practice, to the role of the state’s monopoly on violence. After 
the military interventions in the ‘war on terror’ we need to address the question of the 
objectives of the normatively justified conditioning of the monopoly on violence. 
 
The construction of ‘ungoverned spaces’ involves a legitimation discourse in which there is at 
least an attempt to deal with the tensions, outlined above, that drone attacks create with regard 
to the principle of respecting national sovereignty. This legitimation discourse is highly 
questionable, not least because it links spatialisation to culturally charged enemy images85.  In 
particular, the military operations in ‘kill boxes’ seem to suggest that, ostensibly, spaces of 
violence can be limited by means of drone attacks (‘surgical warfare’) but at a deeper level, 
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they actually dissolve spatial limits and, through their sudden deployability, perpetuate 
warfare and open the prospect of ‘ubiquitous war’. This dissolution of spatial boundaries can 
be explained by the logic of the spiral of violence: the response to asymmetrical warfare is 
asymmetrical warfare. Thus, the perpetuation of this form of warfare is inherent in the 
‘rationality’ of drone strikes. The question of legitimation, inasmuch as it is even posed from 
without, is answered in the case of kill boxes simply by pointing to the eliminated ‘prey’. If 
the target can be identified as an ‘absolute enemy’, as in the case of the execution of Osama 
bin Laden, no further questions are in order.  
 
The concept of ‘ungoverned spaces’ then appears as an intermediate step between the 
territorial principle of the nation state and the security paradigm86. The creation of new spaces 
of violence along the lines of ‘ungoverned spaces’ represents an extension of the sovereignty 
of an attacking state beyond its own territory, although without seeking to maintain a 
permanent monopoly on violence over the space attacked. Certain states, thanks to their 
technological lead (especially in the drone/robotics sector), are in a position to wage war 
globally in order to enforce and legitimise the economic and political order they prefer. They 
thus create new spaces of violence to achieve their ends. These new spaces of violence, 
however, have taken shape not as part of a qualitative change in the international system of 
states but as an adaptation of the formally equal system of sovereign states to a changing 
environment in which the weak structures of other states can actually be turned from a risk 
factor to an opportunity for dominant powers in pursuit of their ambitions. The US conducts 
intelligence operations in spaces it declares to be ‘ungoverned’, e.g. in Somalia, Yemen and 
Pakistan, and argues that it is defending its own national security interests by violating the 
sovereignty of those states87. It remains to be seen is if the tensions within the current 
formally equal but actually hierarchical international order heightened by the increasing 
conditioning and violation of sovereignty will unravel this order, or if we are witnessing the 
reinforcement of this order through furthering the actual hierarchy between states through 
freeing considerations of security from regard for state sovereignty.  
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